# Plan v3.3 — Router Front Door (auto wake-on-request) **Date:** 2026-08-14, revised 2026-08-17 (v3.3) **Status:** **IMPLEMENTED & VERIFIED 2026-08-17** — v3.2 passed two review rounds (5 critical + 6 major fixed and confirmed; round-2 minors applied). v3.3 = hardware-driven placement change (GPU2 cleared for single-GPU services → OCR+embed on GPU2, text exclusive on GPU0/1). Implementation record and verification trail: `../../TODO.md`; measured numbers: `../../CALIBRATION.md`. One post-plan correctness fix: persisted wake-intent + startup recovery (E2E case 12), see TODO "Verification trail". **Decisions made with user:** multiple models may be awake concurrently; router = Python FastAPI; tiered idle (level-1 sleep after 15 min, level-2 offload after 3 hr); depth-aware 503 errors. ## 1. Problem & constraints Calling services must be able to hit `http://:8000/v1/...` with any of our three models at any time, with no knowledge of load state. Hard constraints: 1. **Native to the Docker stack** — the entire request path runs inside containers; no host-side cron, watchers, or helpers. 2. **No docker permissions on the request path** — model load/unload/switch is pure HTTP (vLLM Sleep Mode). Docker is only needed for rare manual ops (image upgrade, pulling new models). 3. **Highly reliable** — failures degrade to depth-aware 503 + `Retry-After`, never a hang, never a proxy to a half-awake backend. The Plan v2 nginx front door hid dev endpoints but did **not** wake models on request; that inverted priority is what this plan fixes. ## 2. Hardware reality (re-verified 2026-08-17 — see NOTES-2026-08-17-gpu2-recheck.md) - **3× A800-SXM4-80GB**. P2P is **still broken host-wide, 4/6 paths corrupt**, but the fault MOVED: now every transfer **sourced from GPU0 or GPU1** corrupts; GPU2-sourced transfers are the only clean ones (was the inverse on 2026-08-13). Per-GPU integrity (H2D/D2H, matmul, stress) passes on all three, twice. - Consequences: `NCCL_P2P_DISABLE=1` + `--disable-custom-all-reduce` stay mandatory for any TP>1 workload (host-staged copies verify clean — which is why TP=2 on GPU0+1 with P2P off works). **GPU2 is usable for single-GPU services** (no P2P involved; H2D/D2H verified clean). - On-disk models (verified): `Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8` (43GB dir), `OvisOCR2` (1.8GB), `Qwen3-Embedding-8B` (12GB). **User confirmed 2026-08-14: the 8B embedding model is the intended one** (earlier docs mentioning a 0.6B were wrong; slices are sized for the 8B). ## 3. Architecture ``` ┌──────────────────── Docker network ────────────────────┐ callers ─► :8000 ─► ┌─────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐ │ router │ ─►│ vllm-text (TP=2) │ │ vllm-ocr GPU2 │ │ FastAPI │ │ GPU0 + GPU1 only │ │ vllm-embed GPU2 │ └─────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ 127.0.0.1:8010 (admin) ``` - **One always-running vLLM service per model**, each with `--enable-sleep-mode` + `VLLM_SERVER_DEV_MODE=1`, each pinned to a GPU memory slice so all three can be awake simultaneously. - **Router** is the only public ingress (port 8000). It owns: model-name → service mapping, wake-on-request, streaming proxy, tiered idle management, and dev-endpoint hiding (404 for anything not an allowed path, matched on the **normalized** path to defeat `/v1/../sleep` traversal). - **Admin API is a separate listener** published only on `127.0.0.1:8010` — NOT paths on the public port (review C5: a public `/admin/sleep` would be a trivial remote DoS). - **nginx is removed.** The router replaces it. - **Placement (v3.3, user-approved 2026-08-17):** text TP=2 gets GPU0+GPU1 **exclusively** (0.85 slice, full 262K context); OCR and embed run TP=1 **on GPU2** — single-GPU services never issue P2P transfers, and GPU2's H2D/D2H paths verify clean (§2). `CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES` is set explicitly per service. Rollback if GPU2 ever misbehaves: change one env var to move a service back to GPU0/1 (slices would need re-tightening). - All services keep `restart: unless-stopped` and `ipc: host` (NCCL shm). Each service's TP TCP store is isolated by its own network namespace — no distributed-init port collision (would only become a risk if someone later sets `network_mode: host`; do not). ## 4. Port layout | Port | Binding | Purpose | |---|---|---| | 8000 | 0.0.0.0 (host) → router | Public API (only public ingress) | | 8010 | 127.0.0.1 (host) → router admin listener | `vllmctl` / debugging | | 8001 | 127.0.0.1 (host) → vllm-text :8000 | Direct debug access | | 8002 | 127.0.0.1 (host) → vllm-ocr :8000 | Direct debug access | | 8003 | 127.0.0.1 (host) → vllm-embed :8000 | Direct debug access | | — | Docker net only | router → vllm-* | **Security boundary, stated explicitly:** the loopback debug ports 8001–8003 expose each service's dev endpoints (`/sleep`, `/wake_up`, …) to **any local user** on this multi-user host, bypassing the router's 404s. Same exposure as the current stack's port 8001; accepted, but "dev endpoints unreachable" means "unreachable from the network," not "unreachable locally." ## 5. GPU memory budget (3× 80GB in use; calibration gates final numbers) `gpu_memory_utilization` is a fraction of **total** GPU memory, and each process accounts only for itself. Budget per GPU: Σ(slices on that GPU) + (CUDA ctx per process ~1–2GB) + boot/wake transients ≤ 0.88 Initial slices (recalibrated in Step 1): | Service | Weights on disk | TP / GPU | util slice | Notes | |---|---|---|---|---| | vllm-text | 43GB (FP8) | 2 / GPU0+1 (exclusive) | 0.85 | full 262K context; KV ~25GB — no 131K fallback needed | | vllm-ocr | 1.8GB | 1 / GPU2 | 0.10 | small vision model | | vllm-embed | 12GB (8B) | 1 / GPU2 | 0.25 | `--max-model-len 8192`; raisable at calibration | Per-GPU: GPU0 = GPU1 = 0.85 + 1 ctx ≈ 0.87; GPU2 = 0.10 + 0.25 = 0.35 + 2 ctx. Disjoint pools — text never competes with the small services, and the small services have an entire idle GPU of headroom. Sleeping (level 2) residual is ~2.5GB per **process** (E2E measured ~5GB total for one TP=2 instance = 1 proc/GPU). Under v3.3 placement: GPU0/GPU1 host 1 process each (text) → ~2.5GB residual; GPU2 hosts 2 (ocr + embed) → ~5GB. Measured in Step 1. ## 6. Router design Python 3.12-slim container, **pinned** fastapi/httpx/uvicorn versions, `restart: unless-stopped`. ~300 lines. **Single process, single event loop, two listening sockets** (public :8000 + admin :8010): run two `uvicorn.Server` instances as coroutines on **one** asyncio loop (uvicorn can't bind two ports in one worker, and two separate processes would break the in-process wake locks — the admin listener MUST share the same locks and depth tracking as the request path). ### 6.1 Model registry (env or `models.json`) ``` text : { service: "vllm-text", model: "Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-FP8", aliases: ["qwen3.6-35b-a3b-fp8", ...] } ocr : { service: "vllm-ocr", model: "OvisOCR2" } embed: { service: "vllm-embed", model: "Qwen3-Embedding-8B" } ``` (No 0.6B alias — the 8B is the confirmed model (2026-08-14); an alias would mislead clients into thinking they got a different model than they did.) Matching is case-insensitive. Unknown `model` → OpenAI-style 404 (`model_not_found`), **no wake triggered**. ### 6.2 Request path 1. Resolve target service: - Content-Type `application/json` → parse body, use `model` field; missing `model` defaults to text **only for** `/v1/chat/completions` and `/v1/completions`; other endpoints require an explicit model. - Non-JSON bodies (e.g. `multipart/form-data` image uploads for OCR — review C2) → **never fully parse**; extract only the small `model` text field from the multipart parts (without reading file parts) and forward the raw buffered body unchanged. A multipart request on `/v1/chat/completions` with no resolvable `model` **defaults to OCR** (that's the image-bearing path). - `/v1/embeddings` → embed service regardless of body. 2. Check service state (cached briefly — don't add a backend round trip to every request): - **awake** → proxy immediately (httpx streaming passthrough, no buffering). - **sleeping/offloading** → single-flight per service under an asyncio lock; concurrent callers await the same event. Re-check `is_sleeping` after acquiring the lock (another path may have just woken or slept it). 3. Wake sequence (proven in E2E on 2026-08-14): `POST /wake_up` → `POST /collective_rpc {"method":"reload_weights"}` → `POST /reset_prefix_cache` → poll `GET /health` until 200. 4. Proxy the held request. **Proxy timeouts (review M4):** httpx connect timeout 5s; read timeout **900s** (matching today's nginx — capped, never disabled, so a wedged backend stream can't hang forever) for both normal and streaming paths; connection pool sized for ≥16 concurrent requests. A 5s default read timeout would kill nearly every generation. **Other public endpoints:** - `/v1/models` → aggregated list of all three registered models (clients commonly list before calling). - `/health` → router liveness + per-service state summary (uptime checks). - `/metrics` → pass through from all services, or omit; decide at implementation (was unauthenticated under nginx anyway). ### 6.2.1 Depth-aware error semantics The router tracks each service's sleep depth from its own actions. **Depth loss after router restart or direct `vllmctl` admin calls:** if sleeping but depth unknown → treat as `offloaded` (conservative — worst case the client waits slightly longer than needed, never gets a too-early retry). Hold-first policy: requests queue during wake and only error if the depth-dependent hold deadline is exceeded. | Situation | Hold deadline | then Status | `Retry-After` | body `sleep_depth` | |---|---|---|---|---| | Wake from level 1 (sleep, ~1–6s) | 30s | 503 | `10` | `"sleeping"` | | Wake from level 2 (offload, ~15–60s+) | 180s | 503 | `60` | `"offloaded"` | | Container restarting (cold start = 2–10 min NFS load) | 300s | 503 | `600` | `"restarting"` | | Unknown model | — | 404 | — | `model_not_found` | 503 body (OpenAI-style, parseable): ```json {"error": {"type": "model_waking", "code": "model_waking", "message": "Model 'OvisOCR2' is waking from offload; retry shortly", "sleep_depth": "offloaded", "estimated_wake_seconds": 45}} ``` **Wake-sequence failure:** retry the sequence once, then the depth-aware 503. Never proxy to a half-awake backend. All deadlines/estimates get re-tuned from latencies logged during calibration (Step 1). ### 6.3 Tiered idle management (replaces `vllmctl idle-watch`) | Tier | Trigger (idle) | Action | State after | Wake cost | |---|---|---|---|---| | Sleep | 15 min (`IDLE_SLEEP_MIN`) | `POST /sleep?level=1` | weights → host RAM | ~1–6s | | Offload | 3 hr (`IDLE_OFFLOAD_MIN`) | `POST /sleep?level=2` | RAM freed; ~5GB/GPU ctx | ~15–60s (NFS) | Race-safety (review M1): the idle manager takes the **same per-service asyncio lock** as the wake path and re-checks under the lock that (a) active-request count == 0 and (b) last-activity is still past the threshold. Last-activity is refreshed at request **completion** as well as arrival, and an active-request counter guards long streaming generations — a 20-minute stream must not trigger sleep mid-flight. **Verify at implementation:** `/sleep?level=2` on a service already sleeping at level 1 must discard the offloaded weights (not no-op/error). Fallback: wake → re-sleep at level 2. **Verify at implementation:** host RAM — level 1 holds a full weights copy (text 43GB + ocr + embed ≈ 57GB total if all three nap simultaneously). Check `free -g` headroom. **NFS risk (accepted, documented):** level-2 wake requires a healthy NFS mount. If NFS is down, the model is unwakeable and the router 503s (with `restarting`-grade Retry-After) until NFS returns. Mitigation option: cap the text model at level 1 (weights stay in RAM). Decide after calibration. ### 6.4 Router restart mid-wake (review M3) The wake lock is in-process and dies with the router. The new instance must not fire a second concurrent wake at a backend already waking. Mitigation: the wake sequence is effectively idempotent from the router's view (re-POST `/wake_up` on an already-waking backend is safe; vLLM serializes it), and the request path re-checks `is_sleeping` under the lock before acting. ### 6.5 Admin API — separate listener, `127.0.0.1:8010` only - `GET /admin/status` — per-service: running?, sleeping?, depth, last activity, wake in progress - `POST /admin/wake/{key}` / `POST /admin/sleep/{key}[?level=1|2]` — manual control (updates the router's depth tracking) ### 6.6 Failure modes | Failure | Router behavior | |---|---| | vLLM container down/crashing | Detect unhealthy; hold up to 300s (`restart: unless-stopped` recovers it — but note cold start is 2–10 min for text); then 503 `Retry-After: 600` | | Wake sequence fails | Retry once, then depth-aware 503 (6.2.1); never proxy half-awake | | Router crash | `restart: unless-stopped`; vLLM services unaffected; at most in-flight requests lost; depth resets to conservative `offloaded` | | Host reboot | **All three vLLM containers cold-start AWAKE** (vLLM has no boot-asleep) — see §7; text on GPU0/1 and small services on GPU2 initialize in parallel without racing; recovery takes minutes, router serves `restarting` 503s meanwhile | | NFS outage | Level-2 unwakeable → 503s until NFS returns (§6.3) | | Request without `model` field | Defaults to text **only** on chat/completions; elsewhere 400 | ## 7. Compose changes - Add `router` service (build `./router/`): public `8000:8000`, admin `127.0.0.1:8010:8010`, `depends_on` all vllm services (`condition: service_started`). - **Boot ordering (simplified in v3.3):** no staggering needed — text initializes on GPU0/1 while OCR and embed initialize on GPU2, disjoint memory pools, no race. All services use plain `depends_on: service_started` (sleep makes healthchecks flappy, so never `service_healthy`). The earlier wait-for-healthy entrypoint choreography (review-2 issue #1) is obsolete under this placement. - Split `vllm` into `vllm-text` / `vllm-ocr` / `vllm-embed` with per-model args baked in; `MODEL_NAME`/`EXTRA_ARGS`/`TP_SIZE`/`MAX_MODEL_LEN` in `.env` become obsolete for serving (kept only for rollback). - Remove `nginx` service and `nginx.conf`. - All services: `restart: unless-stopped`, `ipc: host`, `NCCL_P2P_DISABLE=1`, explicit `CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES`. Per-model serving args (all include `--disable-custom-all-reduce --enable-sleep-mode`, **explicit `--max-model-len` each** — review M2): - **text:** `--reasoning-parser qwen3 --enable-auto-tool-choice --tool-call-parser qwen3_coder --max-model-len 262144 --gpu-memory-utilization 0.85` - **ocr:** `--max-model-len 32768 --gpu-memory-utilization 0.10` (+ vision args from OvisOCR2 model card, e.g. `--limit-mm-per-prompt`) - **embed:** `--max-model-len 8192 --gpu-memory-utilization 0.25` ## 8. `vllmctl` changes - `up [MODEL]` / `down [MODEL]` → HTTP to `127.0.0.1:8010` admin API (no docker needed for routine control). - `status` → `GET 127.0.0.1:8010/admin/status` pretty-printed. - `pull` unchanged (docker, rare, manual). - `idle-watch` removed (router owns idle management). ## 9. Implementation order 0. **Backups + cutover plan (review M5):** `cp compose.yml compose.yml.v2.bak; cp vllmctl vllmctl.v2.bak`. **Status 2026-08-14: `renbaibing` is now in the docker group** (works directly in fresh login shells; use `sg docker -c "…"` in sessions started before the change — `.runas.py`/`.user.env` are obsolete). Old stack already brought down by user; GPUs idle. Rollback: restore `.v2.bak` files, `docker compose up -d`. 1. **Calibration (gates everything):** bring up the three services with initial slices (old stack stopped); measure awake footprints, sleeping residuals, level-1 and level-2 wake latencies, host RAM cost; adjust slices so each GPU ≤ 0.88 including contexts. Log latencies → tune the §6.2.1 deadlines from data. 2. `router/` app (registry, wake single-flight, raw-body-safe routing, streaming proxy with proper timeouts, tiered idle with lock, admin listener) + compose rewiring; nginx removed. 3. `vllmctl` rewrite of up/down/status. 4. E2E verification (below). 5. Docs: README, TODO, memory. ## 10. E2E test matrix 1. All asleep → `POST /v1/chat/completions` (text) → 200 after wake; latency logged. 2. While text awake → `POST /v1/embeddings` → embed wakes independently; both serve. 3. OCR request with **`multipart/form-data`** body (not just JSON base64) → routes correctly, no body parsing error. 4. Idle tiers (shortened timers): 1 min → level-1 sleep (host RAM grows by weights); 3 min → level-2 offload (RAM freed); auto-wake from both. 5. Streaming request during wake → first chunk after wake, no buffering. 6. Unknown model name → 404 `model_not_found`, no wake triggered. 7. Dev endpoints (`/sleep`, `/wake_up`, `/collective_rpc`, `/reset_prefix_cache`) **and** `/admin/*` on public :8000 → 404; admin reachable only via 127.0.0.1:8010. 8. Kill vllm-text container → request → `restarting` 503 (`Retry-After: 600`) during recovery → 200 after restart completes. 9. Concurrent 10× requests while sleeping → exactly one wake sequence (router logs). 10. Depth-aware errors (hold deadline forced to 1s): level-1 wake → 503 `Retry-After: 10`, `"sleeping"`; level-2 → `Retry-After: 60`, `"offloaded"`; body parses with `estimated_wake_seconds`. 11. Idle-race: fire a request at the moment the idle timer expires → request served, no sleep mid-request (lock + active-counter verified). 12. Router restart mid-wake → no double-wake crash; request eventually served. 13. Two services waking concurrently (text + embed requested simultaneously) → both complete, no lock cross-talk. 14. Path traversal: `/v1/../sleep`, `/v1%2f..%2fsleep` → 404. 15. Host reboot (if feasible to test): parallel boot (text on GPU0/1, small services on GPU2 — no race), router serves `restarting` 503s, all three become available. ## 11. Risks / open items - **GPU slice calibration** gates final numbers (§5, Step 1). v3.3 placement (text exclusive on GPU0/1 at 0.85) removes the KV-starvation concern; calibration confirms. - **GPU2 trust:** single-GPU tests pass (2026-08-17, twice), but it has a fault history (Aug 11 driver re-probe). Mitigation: E2E test 3+4 exercise it before rollout; if GPU2 degrades in production, move OCR/embed back to GPU0/1 with one env-var change each (slices re-tighten to v3.2 values). - ~~Which embedding model~~ — **resolved 2026-08-14: Qwen3-Embedding-8B.** - **Level 1→2 escalation** and **host RAM** (~57GB if all three nap) need verification (§6.3). - **NFS outage strands level-2 models** — accepted risk or cap text at level 1 (§6.3). - Wake latency must fit calling services' client timeouts — confirm their settings before rollout.